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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people with a mental illness are able to care for 
themselves and seek mental health treatment on their own.  In 
some cases, however, they may experience temporary periods of 
mental illness or may have progressed to a point in their disease 
when they are incompetent to make medical treatment decisions 
for themselves.  These individuals may be experiencing a period of 
severe depression or suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and do not 
meet the requirements for judicial commitment.  Therefore, a 
third party should be available to consent to voluntary admission to 
a mental health facility and mental health treatment on behalf of 
the incompetent person. 
The primary goal of this article is to demonstrate the need for 
allowing a broad range of persons to legally consent for an 
incompetent person to voluntary admission and treatment of a 
mental illness.  Many states have adopted surrogate decision-maker 
statutes that permit family and friends to substitute their consent in 
the absence of a legal guardian or health care power of attorney 
appointed by the patient.1  The author recommends adoption of 
such a statute in Minnesota and other states that do not permit a 
third party to consent to mental health treatment and admissions. 
With certain protections for abuse, surrogate decision-maker 
statutes will benefit many patients with a mental illness.  If state law 
does not permit anyone, or even a narrow range of persons to 
consent, an incompetent person may have difficulty being admitted 
or treated voluntarily.  Furthermore, the incompetent person may 
not meet state requirements for civil commitment and would go 
untreated.  Even if eligible for commitment, judicial intervention is 
time-consuming and potentially humiliating and dehumanizing for 
patients and their families. 
 
 1. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (West Supp. 2002). 
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II. INFORMED CONSENT 
In the United States, there is a belief in individual autonomy, 
which includes an individual’s “right to be free from 
nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic 
moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his 
or her will.”2  This principle was articulated in the medical context 
by Justice Cardozo who said, “[e]very human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body . . . .”3 
It is well-established that health care providers must discuss 
with their patients the risks, benefits, and alternatives of a 
procedure they are about to undergo.  In some instances, though, a 
patient is unable to give consent because he or she is unconscious 
or lacks the mental capacity.  Generally, in the absence of an 
advanced directive or legal guardian, health care providers can 
obtain consent from next-of-kin when a patient is unable to 
consent on his or her own. 
This practice is generally prohibited, or at least not expressly 
permitted in many states including Minnesota, for patients seeking 
voluntary admission to a mental health facility or mental health 
treatment.  There are several reasons for the distinction.  Health 
care providers are often reluctant to make a determination that a 
patient is incompetent.  There are no blood tests or other 
diagnostic tools such as those used to diagnose physical conditions.  
Providers must rely on subjective criteria based on a patient’s 
behavior.  Also, the concept of voluntary admission of a patient 
with a mental illness is relatively new.  At one time, patients with a 
mental illness were always committed.  Finally, there is a concern 
that family members who are allowed to consent on behalf of a 
mentally ill person will admit them and “throw away the key.” 
III. PREFERENCE OF VOLUNTARY ADMISSION 
OVER CIVIL COMMITMENT 
According to one survey, 71% of admissions to psychiatric 
inpatient settings of all types are voluntary.4  “Hospitalization is 
 
 2. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 320 
(4th ed. 2001). 
 3. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 4. Francine Cournos, et al., Report of the Task Force on Consent to Voluntary 
Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 293, 293 (1993) (citing 
3
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offered voluntarily to decrease the pressures of external 
responsibility when the patient is overwhelmed by them and to 
provide structure, a supportive milieu, protection, intensive care, 
closely supervised pharmacotherapy, electroconvulsive therapy, or 
other forms of treatment.”5 
A.  Autonomy, Stigma, and Resources 
Most mental health professionals prefer voluntary admissions 
to a psychiatric hospital for three primary reasons: (1) a patient 
who maintains autonomy is more likely to cooperate in treatment, 
(2) voluntary admission carries less of a stigma than involuntary 
commitment, and (3) formal proceedings require significant 
psychiatric and judicial resources.6 
According to the National Institute of Mental Health, 
approximately 22% of American adults suffer from a diagnosable 
mental disorder in a given year,7 although half do not seek 
treatment.8  One of the reasons attributed to so many Americans 
not seeking help is the stigma and fear associated with having a 
mental illness or mental disorder.9 
Voluntary admission avoids the stigma associated with a court 
determination of incompetency.10  Labeling an individual 
incompetent can result in being “stigmatized in the eyes of the 
community” and patients “may come to view themselves in ways 
that can reinforce and even worsen their impairment.”11  In 
 
Unpublished Data, Client/Patient Sample Survey, National Institute of Mental 
Health, 1986). 
 5. THOMAS GUTHEIL T. & PAUL APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 73 (3d ed. 2000). 
 6. Id. at 47. 
 7. National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in 
America: A Summary of Statistics Describing the Prevalence of Mental Disorders in America, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
 8. THE OFFICE FOR SPECIAL POPULATIONS, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN FOR REDUCING 
HEALTH DISPARITIES 29 (2001), http://search2.google.cit.nih.gov/search?q=cache 
:gZw-vFzlYi8J:www.nimh.nih.gov/strategic/healthdisparities.pdf+national+ 
institute+of+mental+health+five-year+strategic+plan&access=p&output=xml_no 
_dtd&ie=UTF-8&client=NIMH_frontend&site=NIMH&oe=UTF-&proxystylesheet= 
NIMH_frontend. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Paul S. Appelbaum, Voluntary Hospitalization and Due Process: The Dilemma 
of Zinermon v. Burch, 41 HOSP. &  COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1059, 1060 (1990). 
 11. Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications 
for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 6, 41 (1995). 
4
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addition, “[t]heir motivation to attempt future behavior in the area 
in question may be altered in ways that prevent future success, and 
they may experience serious depression and a damaged sense of 
psychological well-being.”12  In fact, “incompetency labeling may 
itself be psychologically damaging and even disabling . . . [and] 
may set up a self-fulfilling prophecy that serves to increase and 
perpetuate the individual’s social and mental health problems.”13  
Finally, voluntary admission allows for “a stronger alliance with 
treatment personnel”14 and eliminates the need for a “costly, time-
consuming, and anti-therapeutic”15 commitment proceeding. 
“[T]he idea that the mentally ill might be able to sign 
themselves into psychiatric hospitals voluntarily is a relatively new 
one.”16  Civil rights for mentally ill patients did not gain attention 
until the 1960s.17  At that time, patients who were deemed 
incompetent could be prohibited from writing a will, marrying, 
disposing of property, entering into contracts, voting, and driving a 
car.18  Even today, some of these rights are not entirely available to 
patients with a past or present mental illness.  Voting rights, for 
example, are still restricted in forty-four states for individuals with 
certain mental illnesses.19 
Therefore, voluntary admissions were not the norm until the 
1970s.  At that time, most states incorporated two distinctive 
features, originating from the District of Columbia, into their 
commitment law: (1) Patients retain all civil rights upon 
hospitalization, i.e. are presumed to be legally competent; and (2) 
patients must be found dangerous to others or themselves before 
they could be involuntarily committed.20 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 1060. 
 15. Rael Jean Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief 
History of Mental Health Law “Reform,” 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 92 (1992). 
 16. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 46. 
 17. Id. at 94. 
 18. Isaac & Brakel, supra note 15, at 97; see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND 
MENTAL DISABILITY 143 (1994) (according to 1980 NIMH statistics, voluntary 
patients comprised nearly 42% of all patients admitted to state and county mental 
hospitals, over 87% of all admitted to private psychiatric hospitals, and over 84% 
of all those admitted to nonfederal general hospitals for psychiatric services, and, 
in the aggregate, totaled nearly 840,000 admissions (citing Mental Health, United 
States, 1983, at 45 (C.A. Taube & S.A Barrett eds., 1985))). 
 19. Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote. I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 
51 PSYCHIATRY SERVICES 849, 849 (2000). 
 20. Isaac & Brakel, supra note 15, at 99. 
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B. Contra Postion:  Commitment Necessary to Protect Rights 
Not everyone believes that voluntary admission is preferential.  
Some reasons offered against voluntary admission include potential 
for patient abuse, coercion, fewer discharge opportunities, lack of 
an adversarial process, no attorney representation, and no 
maximum length of stay.21  In addition, it is asserted that, in order 
to prevent abuse, “states should not allow persons with power of 
attorney, conservatorship, or guardianship to voluntarily admit a 
mentally ill person under their care without a formal court 
review.”22  Finally, it is proffered that consultation with an attorney 
is essential to ensure voluntary consent and one should be provided 
to any patient who is considering voluntary admission.23  Only upon 
a “thorough interview and investigation” by the attorney that 
concludes the patient can provide informed consent should 
voluntary admission be allowed without judicial review.24 
According to Brakel, Parry, and Weiner, in 1985, a third-party 
admission procedure that permits guardians or parents to make 
commitment decisions should not even be considered a voluntary 
procedure.25  Similarly, another author believes that “[v]oluntary 
psychiatric hospitalization should be the result of a competent and 
informed decision arrived at within a non-coercive environment.  
Hospitalization based on anything less is not only involuntary, but it 
is an infringement of personal liberty.”26 
Indeed, “one could advance the theory that the proper 
procedure for patients who are unable to voluntarily consent to 
hospitalization is involuntary civil commitment.”27  The author is 
validly concerned that informed consent is necessary to voluntarily 
admit a patient and that allowing the patient to be voluntarily 
admitted based on his or her consent without any competency 
determination leaves too much room for abuse.  With the 
exception of implementing an expiration date requiring a review of 
voluntary admission status, however, the author’s suggested 
 
 21. Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric 
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 28-29 (1999). 
 22. Id. at 33. 
 23. Id. at 34. 
 24. Id. at 35. 
 25. SAMUAL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 177 (3d 
ed. 1985). 
 26. Stone, supra note 21, at 26. 
 27. Id. at 39. 
6
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remedies for the problem are not appropriate solutions.28 
First, to require attorney involvement for every voluntary 
inpatient admission would be costly and burdensome to patients 
and providers.  It is also unnecessary.  These attorneys would 
typically lack prior knowledge of the patient or the patient’s social 
or medical history.  In addition, a competency determination is 
hardly something that is within an attorney’s professional 
knowledge.29 
Second, a guardian who has already been appointed by a court 
is an appropriate person to provide informed consent without 
additional judicial review, at the very least for nonintrusive mental 
health treatment or admission to a mental health facility.  In 
addition, absent any indication that the patient appointed a health 
care power of attorney at a time when he or she was incompetent, it 
defies understanding why the patient’s own expressed wishes would 
not be followed.  To the extent, however, that the patient 
appointed a general power of attorney for financial affairs, the 
author agrees that he or she should not be permitted to consent to 
mental health treatment because the patient contemplated 
financial, not medical, decision-making power. 
Finally, it is not in a patient’s best interest to be subjected to a 
formal commitment.  Nor is it necessary to require a competency 
review by an administrative law judge as suggested in those 
instances when the otherwise voluntary patient is brought to the 
hospital by family, a care provider, or the police.30  Appropriate 
safeguards can be implemented without the need to involve the 
judiciary or formally commit a patient. 
While it may be argued that permitting family members or 
close friends to make medical decisions on behalf of another 
without judicial approval has the potential for abuse, “the evidence 
for such abuse is all but nonexistent, and the health care system 
would slip into paralysis if it had to delay treatment of the large 
percentage of severely ill patients who are incompetent until a 
court hearing could be obtained.”31 
 
 28. See id. at 42. 
 29. The United States Supreme Court agrees.  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (according to Justice Blackmun, “there is certainly no reason 
to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in 
making [treatment] decisions.”). 
 30. Stone, supra note 21, at 41-42. 
 31. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 226. 
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IV. COMPETENCY32 
“Competence can be seen as a threshold requirement for 
persons to retain the power to make decisions for themselves.”33  
Competence can be divided into two categories: legal and clinical.34  
Legal incompetence is only declared through a judicial finding that 
the person is unable to make decisions about his or her own care 
and welfare.35  Incompetence at this level probably does not pertain 
to most mentally ill persons.36  A person who cannot at least make 
and verbalize a treatment decision at some level, as determined by 
a doctor rather than a judge, is clinically incompetent.37  This 
person would not have the functional ability to consent to medical 
or psychiatric care. 
Because most mental health professionals favor voluntary 
admission, “in practice the question of competence is usually 
ignored.”38  This may be particularly striking to some in light of a 
1990 decision by the United States Supreme Court, which raised 
concerns about voluntary admissions for patients who lacked the 
capacity to consent.39 
A. Zinermon v. Burch  
Zinermon v. Burch involved procedural due process issues in a 
civil rights action.40  The decision gained attention amongst health 
 
 32. For purposes of this article, competency and capacity are used 
interchangeably.  Traditionally the term capacity has been used by physicians 
whereas competency is a term used in the legal arena.  See Cournos et al., supra 
note 4, at 298. 
 33. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 220. 
 34. BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE 116 (1993). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 48. 
 39. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (5-4 decision). 
 40. Id..  Respondent Burch was found wandering along a Florida highway and 
taken to a private mental health care facility.  Id. at 118.  Upon admission, Burch 
was hallucinating, confused, and psychotic and believed he was “in heaven.”  Id.  
Despite his mental state, he was asked to sign the necessary forms giving consent to 
admission and treatment.  Id.  He signed the forms and remained at the facility for 
three days.  Id.  He was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia and given 
psychotropic medication.  Id.  Needing longer-term care, Burch was transferred to 
a state hospital.  Id.  He was asked to sign forms requesting admission and 
authorizing treatment at the state hospital while still at the private facility.  Id. at 
118-19.  He then signed additional forms for voluntary admission and treatment 
8
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care providers, however, because it discussed at length the 
appropriateness of voluntarily admitting a patient who lacked 
capacity to give informed consent.41  Specifically, Justice Blackmun, 
the author of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion, questioned 
the practice of admitting a patient voluntarily without first 
determining the patient’s competency to consent to admission or 
treatment.42  The holding of the case, however, did not ultimately 
decide the issue of whether a competency determination is 
required.43  Although the Court’s comments are merely dicta,44 the 
strong language is hard to ignore.45 
Justice Blackmun wrote that “[i]t is hardly unforeseeable that a 
person requesting treatment for mental illness might be incapable 
of informed consent, and that state officials with the power to 
admit patients might take their apparent willingness to be admitted 
at face value,”46 resulting in admission of incompetent patients who 
are willing to sign consent forms.47  As a result, the Court 
determined that the state should have predeprivation procedural 
safeguards in place in order to protect a patient’s liberty interest.48  
The Court, however, did not specify what those safeguards should 
 
upon arrival at the state hospital.  Id. at 119.  Burch was asked to sign a form 
authorizing treatment, except electroconvulsive therapy, despite the doctor’s 
progress notes indicating that Burch was distressed, confused, unable to state the 
reason for his hospitalization, and believed that he was in heaven.  Id.  Subsequent 
progress notes indicate that Burch was disoriented, semi-mute, confused, bizarre 
in appearance, uncooperative, extremely psychotic, paranoid, and hallucinating.  
Id. at 119-20.  In total, Burch was hospitalized for five months during which time 
there was no hearing held regarding his hospitalization and treatment.  Id. at 120. 
 41. See generally id. at 114-39. 
 42. Id. at 135-36. 
 43. Id. at 138-39. 
 44. But see, Isaac & Brakel, supra note 15, at 113 (asserting that the Court 
created an affirmative duty to investigate competency); 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally 
Impaired Persons, Incompetents Agreement to Voluntary Admission § 32 (1996) (citing 
Zinermon for the proposition that “[a]n individual who is allowed to sign voluntary 
consent forms, when he or she is incompetent to consent, states a claim for 
violation of procedural due process, since the individual is denied the right to 
receive the procedural safeguards provided in the state’s statutory involuntary-
placement procedures”). 
 45. “[S]tates and their employees are on notice that to avoid liability they 
must exercise reasonable professional judgment in making commitment decisions 
and either must obtain actual informed consent or use involuntary commitment 
procedures.”  John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A Constitutional 
Perspective, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 320, 325 (1994). 
 46. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136. 
 47. Id. at 135. 
 48. Id. at 129. 
9
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be.49 
Finally, although the opinion is based on constitutional law, it 
leaves open the question of whether its directive, even though dicta, 
applies to patients in a private hospital.50  Generally, constitutional 
protections only apply to actions by government entities (federal, 
state, and local).51  Under the state action doctrine, however, “a 
private entity must comply with the Constitution if it is performing 
a task that has been traditionally, exclusively done by the 
government.”52  Alternatively, “the Constitution applies if the 
government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates 
private conduct that violates the Constitution.”53  In other words, 
the government may have an obligation to stop private 
infringement of individuals’ basic freedoms, violations of which 
may be “just as harmful as government violations.”54  Either way, at 
least in Minnesota, it has been recognized that “the primary 
responsibility for mental health care for people with serious mental 
illness rests with state government.”55  Currently, the literature 
reflects a difference of opinion whether Zinermon’s directive would 
apply to a private facility.56  For the time being, this issue remains 
 
 49. “In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a 
constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself 
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest 
without due process of law.”  Id. at 125.  “[In order] to determine whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State 
provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.”  Id. at 126. 
 50. A private facility has a duty to make a competency determination.  
Physicians are required to obtain a patient’s informed consent for medical care.  
E.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn. 1977).  If the patient lacks 
competency, they are unable to consent and the physician will have breached his 
or her duty of care. 
 51. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401-02 (2001). 
 52. Id. at 405 (known as the “public functions exception”). 
 53. Id. at 419 (known as the “entanglement exception”). 
 54. Id. at 404. 
 55. MINN. SUPREME COURT, RESEARCH AND PLANNING OFFICE, STATE COURT 
ADMINISTRATION, ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL COMMITMENT SYSTEM 24 
(1996) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 56. See Paul A. Nidich, Zinermon v. Burch and Voluntary Admissions to Public 
Hospitals: A Common Sense Proposal for Compromise, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998) 
(asserting that Zinermon applies to public facilities).  But see Isaac & Brakel, supra 
note 15, at 113 (asserting that Zinermon applies to both public and private facilities 
by virtue of state law and/or funds in the administration of the state’s mental 
health system); Karl Menninger, II, Wrongful Confinement to a Mental Health or 
Developmental Disabilities Facility, 44 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 217 n.70 (2005) 
(asserting a more middle-of-the-road position that Zinermon applies to both state-
operated facilities and private facilities that are designated by the state as facilities 
10
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unanswered and debatable. 
B. Determining Competency 
There is no universal definition or method of determining 
competency.57  The quest for an accurate test has been keeping 
mental health providers and scholars occupied for years.  Part of 
the difficulty is that each patient has his or her own unique mental 
capabilities.  In addition, a patient’s mental status can fluctuate in 
any given day, week, month or year.  Nonetheless, even a person 
with a severe mental illness may be competent to make at least 
some medical decisions.58 
After Zinermon, an American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
Task Force was formed, in part, to establish criteria for providers to 
apply in assessing competency.  To preserve the preference of 
voluntary admissions, “the task force suggested that only a minimal 
level of capacity be required.”59  In other words, it “recommended 
in-hospital administrative decisions (as opposed to full-blown 
judicial hearings) predicated on easy-to-meet substantive 
standards.”60  Specifically, it recommended using two tests for 
capacity: the ability to communicate choices and the ability to 
understand relevant information.61  These tests would be satisfied 
upon (1) an expression of “agreement with admission and 
treatment in any way, verbal, behavioral or written,” and 
(2) “displaying [of] some minimal understanding of where [the 
patient] is and why.”62 
Since the Task Force’s report, a study was conducted to 
determine whether the APA’s criterion was sufficient for patients to 
comprehend their status and warrant voluntary admission. 63  The 
 
that can accept emergency admissions and evaluate the subject persons for 
involuntary admission). 
 57. 44 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 217 (2005). 
 58. See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 n.7 (Minn. 1988); Stephen B. 
Billick et al., Competency to Consent to Hospitalization in the Medical Patient, 25 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 191, 191-96 (1997) (study supporting the position that adult 
voluntary psychiatric inpatients may retain significant competency even in the face 
of severe psychiatric illness). 
 59. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 48. 
 60. Isaac & Brakel, supra note 15, at 115-16. 
 61. Cournos et al., supra note 4, at 300. 
 62. Isaac & Brakel, supra note 15, at 116. 
 63. Binyamin C. Appelbaum et al., Competence to Consent to Voluntary Psychiatric 
Hospitalization: A Test of a Standard Proposed by APA, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1193 
(1998). 
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study supports the idea that “most patients seeking voluntary 
hospitalization can pass a low-threshold test of capacity.”64  Patients 
who are initially admitted involuntarily, however, may be 
“particularly at risk for impaired capacity.”65 
V. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
A. Zinermon Court’s Approach 
The Zinermon decision requires “states to have fair procedures 
for assuring the competency of patients who make decisions to 
hospitalize themselves.”66  The Court did not specify, however, what 
predeprivation procedural safeguards would be adequate to protect 
a patient’s liberty interest.  “It is unclear whether the Court would 
actually restrict voluntary hospitalization only to those patients 
found competent . . . .”67  The Court noted that protections for due 
process might include appointment of a guardian advocate to make 
treatment decisions, and periodic judicial review of placement.68  
Consequently, the decision leaves the door open for states to 
decide.  Importantly, the decision does not foreclose the possibility 
of having a family or close friend act as a surrogate in those 
instances where the patient is unable to consent. 
B. American Psychiatric Association’s Approach 
Early on, the APA took the position that a surrogate or other 
third party could provide consent on behalf of a voluntary 
incompetent patient.  Prior to Zinermon, the APA established 
guidelines that physicians “obtain, in addition to the consent of the 
patient, the informed consent of the patient’s next of kin or 
guardian.”69  In a post-Zinermon review of those guidelines, the Task 
Force expanded that concept by stating that 
[i]nsofar as third party consent to voluntary admission is 
 
 64. Id. at 1195.  But see Norman G. Poythres et al., Capacity to Consent to 
Voluntary Hospitalization: Searching for a Satisfactory Zinermon Screen, 24 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439-52 (1996). 
 65. Appelbaum et al., supra note 63, at 1196 (citing Poythres et al., supra note 
64). 
 66. BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW 201 (1997). 
 67. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 48. 
 68. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990). 
 69. Cournos et al., supra note 4, at 298 (emphasis added). 
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appropriate and permitted in a given state, it need not be 
restricted to the next of kin or a guardian.  A third party 
decision maker could be an individual designated by health care 
proxy or any other surrogate that the law permits.70 
The Task Force also recommended a series of clinical 
safeguards including “review of voluntariness, appropriateness, and 
capacity prior to admission and again within 72 hours after 
hospitalization,” an “intake evaluation” by the third day, 
development of a “treatment plan,” and “quality assurance 
mechanisms” such as monitoring by existing quality assurance 
committees.71  Finally, “[h]ospitalization should continue only if it 
is medically necessary.”72 
These safeguards are beneficial because (1) they maintain the 
preference of admitting patients voluntarily, (2) provide an 
opportunity for a person close to the patient to be involved in 
treatment decisions, and (3) do not require a formal judicial 
proceeding.  “[A] legislative scheme which encourages voluntary 
admissions while maintaining appropriate oversight” is ideal.73 
VI. THIRD PARTY DECISION MAKERS 
A. Categories 
There are essentially three categories of third party decision 
makers: (1) those formally appointed by a court (e.g. 
guardian/conservator), (2) those declared by the patient in an 
advanced directive (e.g., durable power of attorney for health 
care), and (3) those permitted to make such decisions (e.g., family 
members or close friends) with or without existing state law but in 
no event requiring judicial approval.  This section will focus on the 
third group. 
B. Surrogate Decision-Maker Statutes 
Despite the increasing popularity of advanced directives, many 
patients fail to execute them, or they may be invalid or inapplicable 
for a variety of reasons.74  To bridge this gap, many states have 
 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 302-03. 
 72. Id. at 303. 
 73. See Nidich, supra note 56, at 713. 
 74. Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living 
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passed surrogate decision-making or family consent statutes that 
give family members or other surrogates increased powers to make 
decisions on behalf of an incompetent person regarding his or her 
medical treatment.75  These statutes “serve to protect medical 
practitioners from liability for treating an incompetent patient and 
. . . are intended to preserve the principle of autonomy by 
authorizing an individual who is most likely to know what decisions 
the incompetent patient would make to give informed consent on 
behalf of the incompetent patient.”76 
At least thirty-four states have enacted surrogate consent 
statutes.77  The term “surrogate decision maker,” however, is not 
uniformly defined.  In some states, a surrogate may only make 
decisions involving end-of-life decisions.78  In others, surrogates are 
permitted to make medical decisions on behalf of an individual 
who lacks capacity to consent to treatment based on an order of 
priority provided by statute.79  Still others require court 
appointment before being permitted to make mental health 
decisions.80  Therefore, it is critical to note that the meaning of the 
term surrogate may be different depending on the applicable state 
law. 
The following states expressly permit a third person to make at 
least some decisions for mental health treatment without judicial 
approval: Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, 
Mississippi, Virginia, and Washington.81  Other states, including 
Florida, Illinois, and New Mexico, expressly disallow third parties to 
make decisions for mental health admissions or treatment.82  Still 
others, such as Minnesota, have very narrow categories of third 
 
Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 125-34 (1993). 
 75. See Practising Law Institute, Healthcare Decision-Making Training Module, 75 
PRACTISING. L. INST. N.Y. 357, 365 (2000). 
 76. Adrienne E. Quinn, Who Should Make Medical Decisions for Incompetent 
Adults?  A Critique of RCW 7.70.065, 20 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 573, 578 (1997). 
 77. Practising Law Institute, supra note 75, at 447. 
 78. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (1989). 
 79. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-
805 (West Supp. 2002). 
 80. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1b (2004). 
 81. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-
18.5-103, -14-505 (West 2005); D.C. CODE § 21-2210 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9-
2, -4; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-805; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211 (Supp. 
2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 
(Supp. 2002). 
 82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 2005); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-
601.2 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13 (West 2003). 
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persons who may consent (e.g., health care power of attorney or 
county agency).83  Many others do not specifically permit or limit 
decisions for mental health treatment.  Of the states that expressly 
permit a non-judicially appointed third party to consent, none 
appear to have been challenged on due process grounds.  In 
particular, none have been challenged on the basis that a non-
judicially appointed surrogate was an insufficient safeguard to 
protect the person’s rights before admission or treatment for a 
mental illness. 
Typically, statutes provide a list of individuals permitted to act 
as surrogates and often, but not always, in an order of priority.  
Those individuals generally include: spouse, parent, child, sibling, 
and closest living relative.  Less common are a close friend, 
domestic partner, grandparent, grandchild, religious superior, 
“adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, 
who is familiar with the patient’s personal values,”84 or a 
“committee for the patient.”85  Only Minnesota lists a government 
agency as an acceptable surrogate.86  This is likely because most 
states recognize that “[g]overnmental and nonprofit health and 
welfare agencies . . . in fact rarely have the resources or inclination” 
to act as a surrogate.87 
1. One Approach: Washington State 
Washington permits a surrogate decision maker to admit an 
incompetent patient for mental health treatment and make mental 
health treatment decisions.88  The approved decision makers are 
listed in order of priority: court-appointed guardian, durable power 
of attorney for health care, and then spouse, adult children, 
parents, and adult siblings.89  This approach is beneficial to the 
patient because one of these persons is likely to be available to act 
in the patient’s best interest based on a personal connection with 
the patient.  On the other hand, this approach does not address a 
situation where someone close to the patient does not fall within 
 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 84. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211. 
 85. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986. 
 86. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1a. 
 87. JESSICA W.BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL 
PRACTICE 112 (2d ed. 2001). 
 88. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1). 
 89. Id. 
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the list or is inappropriately preceded in the order of priority (e.g., 
an estranged mother would have priority over a sister whom the 
person sees on a weekly basis).90  A surrogate decision-maker statute 
should allow as much flexibility as possible for determining who is 
best able to express the patient’s wishes. 
2. Use of a Hospital Ethics Committee 
In the event of a dispute or question involving the most 
appropriate surrogate, a hospital ethics committee may be an 
appropriate forum for making that determination.91  If necessary, 
the committee could be required to consider the following factors: 
(1) with whom the incompetent patient resided before 
becoming incompetent; (2) who of the eligible decision 
makers was in close contact with the incompetent patient 
over the years immediately prior to the patient becoming 
incompetent; (3) who shared an intimate relationship 
with the patient; (4) who has discussed the patient’s 
wishes concerning medical treatment with the 
incompetent patient before the patient became 
incompetent; and (5) who has cared for and will continue 
to care for the incompetent patient.92 
VII. MINNESOTA  COMMITMENT ACT 
A. Overview 
The procedures for admission and treatment of a person with 
a mental illness in Minnesota are contained in the Minnesota 
Commitment and Treatment Act (the “Act”).93  The Act includes 
procedures for admitting and treating patients voluntarily,94 or 
involuntarily under a civil commitment.95  In order to be admitted 
or treated voluntarily, the patient must give consent.96  If the 
patient is not capable of giving informed consent (i.e., is 
incompetent), then he or she may be admitted or treated 
 
 90. Quinn, supra note 76, at 575. 
 91. Id. at 602-03. 
 92. Id. at 605-06. 
 93. MINN. STAT. ch. 253B (2004). 
 94. Id. § 253B.04. 
 95. Id. § 253B.064- .066, .07- .08. 
 96. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1. 
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voluntarily only under very limited conditions.97  Patients who fall 
outside these limited conditions must either be committed or go 
untreated. 
In 1994, a Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force was formed at 
the request of the legislature to recommend specific changes to the 
Civil Commitment system.  “The Task Force heard testimony that 
the commitment process is dehumanizing and difficult for 
proposed patients and families.”98  The Task Force also learned that 
“it is especially difficult to suffer the stigma of Civil Commitment 
when the person, although incompetent, is not resisting the 
proposed treatment.”99  Further testimony also suggested that “this 
is particularly true for elderly persons who do not wish to be 
committed, but for whom due to incapacity there is no other 
option.”100 
The Task Force established “that a new option, other than 
Civil Commitment, should be available for persons who are in need 
of mental health treatment, not resisting treatment, but are 
incompetent to give informed consent to treatment or 
admission.”101  The Task Force recommended “that the local 
mental health authority, or its designee, have the authority to give 
informed consent on behalf of a person agreeing to [nonintrusive] 
mental health treatment.”102 
When the legislature ultimately amended the Voluntary 
Admission and Treatment Statute, it gave the county the power to 
consent for a person lacking capacity in the absence of a health 
care power of attorney.103 
B.  Mental Illness Defined 
Under the Act, “[a] person with a mental illness may seek or 
voluntarily agree to accept treatment or admission to a facility.”104  
The term “mental illness” is defined in the Act as an organic 
 
 97. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a (providing that if a person is incapable of giving 
informed consent, “the designated agency or its designee may give informed 
consent for mental health treatment or admission to a treatment facility on behalf 
of the person.”). 
 98. FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 35. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 (2004). 
 104. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(a). 
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disorder of the brain or a clinically significant disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, memory, or behavior that is listed 
in the clinical manual of the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-9-CM), current edition, code range 290.0 to 302.99 or 306.0 
to 316.0 or the corresponding code in the APA’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-MD), current edition, 
Axes I, II, or III, and that seriously limits a person’s capacity to 
function in primary aspects of daily living such as personal 
relations, living arrangements, work, and recreation.105  
This definition includes depression, schizophrenia, and 
bipolar disorder as well as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease.  Drug 
abuse and nicotine dependence, however, are excluded. 
C.  Informed Consent 
According to the Act’s patients’ rights section, “any person 
who is receiving treatment or committed [under the Act],”106 also 
“has the right to prior consent to any medical or surgical treatment, 
other than treatment for chemical dependency or nonintrusive treatment for 
mental illness.”107  This leaves open the question of what rights, if 
any, are available to a voluntary patient receiving nonintrusive 
treatment for a mental illness.108  Although strangely not providing 
voluntarily admitted patients with a right to consent to nonintrusive 
treatment, it is possible to infer such a right from another section 
of the Act: 
A person with a mental illness may seek or voluntarily 
agree to accept treatment or admission to a facility. If the 
mental health provider determines that the person lacks 
the capacity to give informed consent for the treatment or 
admission, and in the absence of a health care power of 
attorney that authorizes consent, the designated agency or 
its designee may give informed consent for mental health 
treatment or admission to a treatment facility on behalf of 
 
 105. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 12a (referring to id. § 245.462, subd. 20(a)). 
 106. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 15. 
 107. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6 (emphasis added). 
 108. “[This] section does not say that [treatment for chemical dependency or 
mental illness] may be carried on without prior consent.”  Eric S. Janus & Richard 
M. Wolfson, The Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982: Summary and Analysis, 6 
HAMLINE L. REV. 41, 53 (1983).  “Rather, it simply excludes such treatment from 
the statutory requirement of prior consent.  Other sources of law—such as the 
Constitution or administrative rules and regulations—may well impose consent 
requirements.”  Id. 
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the person.109 
Also of note, this section of the Act does not make a distinction 
between intrusive and nonintrusive treatment for mental illness.  
Rather, it implies that all treatment of a voluntarily admitted 
patient with mental illness requires consent.   
D.  Preference of Voluntary Admission Over Civil Commitment 
In Minnesota, and in many other states, “[v]oluntary 
admission is preferred over involuntary commitment and 
treatment.”110  Prior to 1997, however, Minnesota law did not 
expressly allow an incompetent person to be admitted voluntarily.  
The Task Force noted in its 1996 report that, “[i]f a facility knows 
or should know that the person is incapable of making an informed 
decision about his or her admission, the facility cannot admit the 
person as a voluntary patient.”111 
According to testimony before the House of Representative’s 
Health and Human Services Committee on the proposed 
amendments to the voluntary provision, some institutions were 
refusing to treat persons where there was any doubt of their ability 
to consent—in some cases this was nearly a categorical refusal to 
treat a patient voluntarily seeking treatment.112  As a result, the Task 
Force recommended permitting an alternative method for 
obtaining consent in order “to make it clearer that voluntary 
treatment is preferred.”113  The alternative method chosen by the 
Task Force was to permit an agency selected by the county board to 
give informed consent. 
E.  Competency 
When determining capacity to consent to voluntary admission, 
providers are to use “clinical admission criteria . . . established by 
the American Psychiatric Association.”114  If a patient is determined 
 
 109. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1a (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1; see also Cournos et al., supra note 4, at 297. 
 111. FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 35 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113 (1990)). 
 112. Hearing on H.F. 735 Before the H.R. Health and Human Serv. Comm., 80th 
Minn. Leg., Apr. 8, 1997 (audio tape) (statement of Beverly Heydinger, Deputy 
Attorney General). 
 113. Hearing on H.F. 735 Before the H.R. Judiciary Comm., 80th Minn. Leg., Apr. 
2, 1997 (audio tape) (statement of Beverly Heydinger, Deputy Attorney General). 
 114. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1. 
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to lack the capacity to consent, the APA defers to applicable state 
law to determine who is permitted to consent to admission and 
treatment.115 
The Act defines the specific criteria to be used for determining 
competency in two circumstances.  First, when the county agency is 
asked to consent to mental health admission or treatment on a 
patient’s behalf, they are asked to apply the following criteria: 
(1) whether the person demonstrates an awareness of 
the person’s illness, and the reasons for treatment, its 
risks, benefits and alternatives, and the possible 
consequences of refusing treatment; and 
(2) whether the person communicates verbally or 
nonverbally a clear choice concerning treatment that 
is a reasoned one, not based on delusion, even 
though it may not be in the person’s best interests.116 
These criteria are similar to that developed by the APA.117  
Second, these criteria are also to be used by a court in determining 
whether a “substitute decision maker” should be appointed to give 
consent if the designated agency declines or refuses to do so.118 
F.  Third Party Decision Makers 
Minnesota does not have a surrogate decision-maker statute 
nor does state common law directly provide for a non-judicially 
appointed surrogate to give informed consent for mental health 
admission or treatment.  The persons who have been expressly 
given the authority to consent for a voluntarily admitted patient are 
narrowly defined in Minnesota Statutes section 253B.04 (the 
“Voluntary Admission and Treatment Statute”) and Minnesota 
Statutes section 253B.092 (the “Neuroleptic Medication Statute”).  
Except in the case of neuroleptic medication, without judicial 
approval, the law only permits guardians, health care power of 
attorneys, and county agencies to consent to voluntary admission 
and treatment for mental illness.119  If none of these persons are 
available to consent, the court must appoint a “substitute decision 
 
 115. See Cournos et al., supra note 4, at 298. 
 116. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(b); see also id. § 253B.092, subd. 5. 
 117. See Cournos et al., supra note 4, at 298. 
 118. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 119. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(a).  Note, however, section 253B.04, subdivision 
1b below regarding guardian consent for admission to a treatment facility. 
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maker.”120  Notably, providers who treat an incompetent patient are 
only given statutory immunity from civil or criminal liability when 
they rely on the consent of a designated agency or court-appointed 
substitute decision maker.121     
In the case of neuroleptic medication, only a health care 
power of attorney (or proxy), court-appointed substitute decision 
maker, or a health care provider in an emergency, may give 
consent when a patient lacks capacity.122 
Understandably, Minnesota law provides more protection for 
patients undergoing “intrusive therapy.”  Under the Act, “‘intrusive 
mental health treatment’ means electroshock therapy and 
neuroleptic medication and does not include treatment for mental 
retardation.”123  The Act does not define the term “nonintrusive 
treatment;” however, based on the definition of intrusive therapy 
above, nonintrusive treatment is likely to include such things as 
psychotherapy and certain medications.  The following provisions 
related to third party consent are separated into two sections: 
admission and treatment that is nonintrusive and treatment that is 
intrusive. 
1. Health Care Power of Attorney 
Under the Voluntary Admission and Treatment Statute, a 
health care power of attorney may consent to mental health 
treatment or admission to a treatment facility.124  Individuals may 
designate a health care power of attorney in an advanced directive 
to make decisions in the event that they become incompetent.125  
Individuals may make a specific declaration directing the health 
care power of attorney as to how treatment decisions should be 
made when intrusive mental health treatment is required (i.e., 
electroshock therapy and neuroleptics).126  In the absence of a 
specific declaration, the health care power of attorney is generally 
authorized to make those decisions. 
The advance directive statutes were intended to help alleviate 
the problem of having no one to provide consent on a patient’s 
 
 120. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 121. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(d). 
 122. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 2. 
 123. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6b. 
 124. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a. 
 125. Id. § 145C.02. 
 126. Id. § 145C.05, subd. 2(6). 
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behalf.  Unfortunately, many patients are without advance 
directives appointing a health care power of attorney.  In the 
hospital, providers are required to inform patients of their ability to 
prepare advance directives.127  Whether that information comes too 
late, or the patient is not sufficiently encouraged to undertake the 
effort or some other reason, only a small number of patients have 
advance directives. 
2. “Designated Agency” 
In the absence of a health care power of attorney, a 
“designated agency” may consent to admission or mental health 
treatment for a patient lacking capacity to consent.128  A 
“designated agency” is defined as “an agency selected by the county 
board to provide the social services required” under the Act.129  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force originally recommended 
that local mental health facilities have the authority to provide 
consent “if the local mental health authority gives informed 
consent on behalf of the person, and the person does not refuse 
treatment, the treatment is allowed.”130  The Task Force’s report 
does not explain why it recommended the local mental health 
authority, rather than a surrogate decision maker such as family, 
friends, and/or an independent medical provider or care team.  
There is also no indication that the counties were provided 
additional resources or training to fulfill this obligation.  
Furthermore, the authority given to the counties is permissive, not 
required.  Therefore, when the county fails or refuses to consent, 
the court must appoint a substitute decision maker. 
3.  Guardians 
Under the Uniform Probate Code, as adopted in Minnesota, 
courts have the power to appoint a guardian to “consent . . . to 
receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, 
treatment or service, except . . . consent for psychosurgery, 
electroshock, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind” 
on behalf of the ward or conservatee.131 
 
 127. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6b. 
 128. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(a). 
 129. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 5. 
 130. FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 35. 
 131. MINN. STAT. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (emphasis added).  Minnesota adopted 
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Initially, the Voluntary Admission and Treatment Statute 
provided only that a health care agent or “designated” agency 
could give consent on behalf of a patient who lacked capacity.  In 
other words, while it appeared under the guardianship provisions 
that a guardian could consent to admission and treatment for 
mental illness, the Act did not extend such authority.  As further 
indication that the Act did not permit guardians to give consent, 
the Legislature added a provision in the 2001 Special Session 
permitting the court to appoint a “substitute decision maker” if the 
county refuses or declines to provide consent.132  A substitute 
decision maker is not defined in the Voluntary Admission and 
Treatment Statute, but it would presumably include a guardian. 
In 2004, the Legislature added a new section in the Voluntary 
Admission and Treatment Statute stating that incompetent patients 
who were voluntarily participating in treatment for a mental illness 
were not subject to commitment if a guardian or conservator gave 
informed consent.133  However, the Legislature did not revise a later 
section providing that only a health care agent or designated 
agency in the absence of a health care agent, could consent to 
admission and treatment for a person who lacks capacity.134  
Therefore, health care providers are left with uncertainty as to 
whether they may obtain consent from a guardian who has not 
been appointed a substitute decision maker.  It only makes sense 
that a judicially appointed guardian should be able to consent to 
admission and treatment for a person with a mental illness; 
however, the Legislature needs to make that clear.  It would be 
repetitive and unnecessary to require family or friends to go to 
court a second time to be appointed as a substitute decision maker. 
In addition, the Legislature repealed the powers of a 
conservator to make any medical decisions earlier in the session.135  
Therefore, the reference to conservators should be removed, or 
clarified to indicate that it applies only to conservators who had the 
authority to consent to mental health treatment prior to the 
effective date of the new provision of the Uniform Probate Code. 
 
the Uniform Probate Code in 2003.  Previously, this language applied to both 
guardianships and conservatorships.  The new section describing a conservator’s 
powers does not contain this language.  Id. § 524.5-417. 
 132. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 133. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1. 
 134. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a. 
 135. See supra note 131. 
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4.  “Substitute Decision Makers” 
In the 2001 special legislative session, the legislature added a 
provision to the Voluntary Admission and Treatment Statute 
allowing a “substitute decision maker” to consent to treatment 
when the designated agency declines.136  A “substitute decision 
maker” is not a term defined in either the general definition 
section of the Act or in the Voluntary Admission and Treatment 
Statute.  The term appears to have been adopted from the 
Neuroleptic Medication Statute enacted in 1997.137 
A substitute decision maker must be appointed by the court.138  
If an incompetent patient does not have a health care power of 
attorney, and the designated agency declines to consent on the 
patient’s behalf, a family member, friend, conservator, or possibly 
even a guardian must petition the court before the patient can be 
admitted or treated.  The duties of a “substitute decision maker” 
are not defined in the Act.  According to testimony in support of 
the bill adding the provision in the Neuroleptic Medication Statute, 
the “substitute decision maker” is called upon “to make a judgment 
as to what [the competent] person would have intended and what 
is in their best interest if their intent can’t be discerned.”139 
5.  Neuroleptic Medication Exception 
In 1997, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a new process for 
the administration of neuroleptic medications to voluntarily 
admitted patients.140  The subdivision regarding voluntary 
treatment or admission for persons with mental illness specifically 
provides that it “does not authorize the administration of 
neuroleptic medications.”141  Rather, “[n]euroleptic medication 
may be administered only as provided in section 253B.092.”142  
Under that section, neuroleptic medication may be administered to 
a patient who lacks capacity,143 without judicial review [only] (1) 
 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 137. Id. § 253B.092. 
 138. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1b. 
 139. Hearing on H.F. 2566 Before the H.R. Judiciary Comm., 80th Minn. Leg., Jan. 
29, 1996 (audio tape) (statement of Beverly Heydinger, Deputy Attorney General). 
 140. MINN. STAT. § 253B.092, subd. 1.  The process is also the same for patients 
who are the subject of a petition for early intervention or commitment.  Id. 
 141. Id. § 253B.04, subd. 1a(f). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. The statute does not indicate how or by whom the determination of 
capacity is to be made in the absence of judicial review.  “In determining a person’s 
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with consent of a health care agent or proxy according to the 
patient’s health care directive;144 (2) with the consent of a substitute 
decision maker appointed by the court and the patient is not 
refusing the medication;145 or (3) by a treating physician in an 
emergency situation, “for so long as the emergency continues to 
exist, up to 14 days,” even if the patient refuses.146 
There are several inconsistencies within this section of the 
statute.  First, it lists the options in such a way as to give the 
impression that they each have equal authority.147  In fact, 
according to the bill of rights section, if the incompetent person 
has appointed a health care agent or proxy in a mental health 
directive to make decisions regarding intrusive treatments, those 
directives “must” be followed.148  A physician who wants to act 
contrary to a directive of a noncommitted person may do so only if 
he or she is committed and a court order authorizes the 
treatment.149  Therefore, item two, and possibly even three, above 
should be permissible only in the absence of a directive. 
Second, the Act states that “the court shall give preference to a 
guardian or conservator, proxy, or health care agent with authority 
to make health care decisions for the patient” when appointing a 
substitute decision maker.150  This presents two issues.  As already 
mentioned, the Act otherwise requires that a patient’s directive 
regarding intrusive therapies “must” be followed.151  Provided that is 
true, it is unnecessary for the court to “give preference” to a health 
care agent because the agent has already been designated by the 
 
capacity to make decisions regarding the administration of neuroleptic 
medication, the court shall consider . . . .”  Id. § 253B.092, subd. 5(b) (emphasis 
added). 
 144. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 2(2).  Note that this section does not specifically 
state what should be done if the patient refuses the medication during the time 
that the agent or proxy have power to consent.  If the health care directive 
specifically stated that medication could be administered even in the event that 
the patient refuses while lacking capacity, then it would probably make sense to go 
ahead.  It is not so clear when the patient does not provide direction under the 
health care directive as to what should be done if they refuse.  See also id. § 
253B.092, subd. 7(b). 
 145. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 2(3). 
 146. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 2(4), subd. 3.  Medication may be administered after 
the 14 days “[i]f a request for authorization to administer medication is made to 
the court” during that time. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 3. 
 147. See id. § 253B.092, subd. 2. 
 148. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6b (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6d(d). 
 150. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 6(a) (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 6b (emphasis added). 
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patient.  In fact, if there were a health care agent, there would 
appear to be no need for the court to appoint a substitute decision 
maker in the first place. 
In addition, this section indicates that the court shall also “give 
preference to a guardian or conservator” when appointing a 
substitute decision maker to consent to administration of 
neuroleptics.152  In 1996, in In re Conservatorship of Foster, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a conservator (and 
presumably a guardian) given the power to consent to necessary 
medical care could consent to administration of neuroleptics 
without seeking prior court approval.153  The Uniform Probate 
Code automatically grants court-appointed guardians the power to 
consent to necessary medical care.154  The list of exceptions does 
not include neuroleptics.  Now that the Neuroleptics Medication 
Statute provides that a court should “give preference” to a guardian 
or conservator when appointing a substitute decision maker, it 
appears that the legislature intended to supersede the Foster court’s 
decision when the Act was amended in 1997. 
G.  Summary 
Minnesota mental health providers are faced with limited 
choices for admitting and treating an incompetent patient with a 
mental illness.  The Act does not clearly define who may consent to 
either admission or treatment for an incompetent patient and 
under what circumstances.  While it may be argued that the 
existing statutory provisions are merely safe harbors, given the 
extensively laid out (although somewhat difficult to follow) 
procedures, providers should be wary of deviating far from them.  
On the other hand, if health care providers strictly comply with the 
existing statutory provisions, patients will be forced unnecessarily 
into the court system and treatment will be delayed. 
While advanced directive provisions sufficiently permit a 
patient to make decisions while competent, in reality, most patients 
have not prepared such documents.  Minnesota should therefore 
adopt a process that would allow, within specific constraints, 
someone close to the patient to act as a surrogate decision-maker 
 
 152. Id. § 253B.092, subd. 6(a). 
 153. 547 N.W.2d 81, 88 (providing that a multidisciplinary treatment review 
panel must also give written approval). 
 154. See MINN. STAT. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i). 
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without having to go to court. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Everyday, family members are permitted to consent on an 
incompetent patient’s behalf for surgery and other medical 
treatment unrelated to mental health.  Mental illness is a medical 
condition that should not require an inflexible, formal judicial 
process in order to treat an incompetent patient.   
In Zinermon, the Supreme Court suggested implementing 
safeguards to protect a patient’s liberty interests rather than 
requiring involuntary commitment for incompetent patients.155  
Minnesota law permits, and purports to encourage, voluntary 
admission for incompetent patients.  The Minnesota Commitment 
Act should be revised to provide less formal and more flexible 
procedures that would permit family or friends to consent to 
treatment of an incompetent patient while at the same time, 
maintain oversight based primarily on a non-judicial system. 
 
 155. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1990). 
27
Halverson: Voluntary Admission and Treatment of Incompetent Persons with a M
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
